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Abstract
We develop a framework for price-mediated contagion in financial systems where banks
are forced to liquidate assets to satisfy a risk-weight based capital adequacy requirement. In
constructing this modeling framework, we introduce a two-tier pricing structure: the volume
weighted average price that is obtained by any bank liquidating assets and the terminal mark-
to-market price used to account for all assets held at the end of the clearing process. We consider
the case of multiple illiquid assets and develop conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
clearing prices. We provide a closed-form representation for the sensitivity of these clearing
prices to the system parameters, and use this result to quantify: (1) the cost of regulation, in
stress scenarios, faced by the system as a whole and the individual banks, and (2) the value
of providing bailouts to consider when such notions are financially advisable. Numerical case
studies are provided to study the application of this model to data.
1 Introduction
The modern day financial system is a highly interconnected network. The connections that
exist within this network are varied, myriad and complex. These connections might be through
direct channels such as interbank debt linkages or through indirect channels such as overlapping
portfolios. These connections provide avenues of contagion in the financial networks. Thus
negative actions of a bank may cause distress to other firms and eventually affect the entire
system. The risk to the financial system, posed by such events, is often called systemic risk.
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It is imperative that we study and understand how this contagion spreads through financial
networks in order to prevent and mitigate systemic crises, e.g., the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
In this work, we study contagion in financial systems from fire sale spillovers. These crises
originate when a firm is forced to liquidate its assets to meet some obligation or satisfy some
regulation. As firms hold overlapping portfolios this causes impacts globally to all other firms
from mark-to-market accounting. These firms are now, themselves, forced to liquidate their
assets, which exacerbates the crisis by depressing asset prices further. An important factor in
the origin of fire sales is the unintended consequence of capital regulations in the form of capital
or leverage ratios. Due to these regulatory constraints, banks might be forced to delever, setting
off a vicious cycle of contagion due to the pro-cyclical nature of these regulatory environments.
Such deleveraging occurred in a large scale in the 2008 financial crisis, resulting in amplifica-
tion of losses. For further discussion on such mechanisms see Braouezec and Wagalath [2019],
Cont and Schaanning [2019].
The literature in the study of fire sales may be broadly divided into two different bodies
depending on the focus of the study. The first places more emphasis on the development of
a general mathematical framework and exploring questions about, e.g., existence and unique-
ness of clearing solutions. Among these works, Cifuentes et al. [2005] considers the liquida-
tion problem in the context of a capital adequacy ratio. Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017]
study the fire sale problem when banks are forced to liquidate assets to meet debt obligations.
Feinstein and El-Masri [2017] develops an extension to Feinstein [2017] where banks, in addi-
tion to meeting their debt obligations, must satisfy a leverage ratio. Braouezec and Wagalath
[2019] considers the problem where banks are required to satisfy a risk-weighted capital ratio.
Feinstein [2020] extends Braouezec and Wagalath [2019] by considering the price-mediated con-
tagion problem in a continuous-time setting to provide results on existence and uniqueness. The
second, broad, body of work on fire sales and price-mediated contagion focuses primarily on the
development of an operational modeling framework and the design of stress tests. Typically
these results depend on a particular liquidation strategy (e.g., proportional liquidation) and
linear price impacts. Some of the notable works in this domain include Greenwood et al. [2015],
Duarte and Eisenbach [2018], Cont and Schaanning [2019].
In this work, we seek to develop a stress testing framework for price mediated contagion
that allows for analytical tractability while also more closely matching the structure of the fi-
nancial system. The primary innovation of this work that facilitates the mathematical results
is the consideration of both mark-to-market prices and volume weighted average prices to char-
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acterize the system. In this model, assets are liquidated at the volume weighted average price,
but unsold assets are marked to the market. This distinction between prices was hinted at
by Cont and Schaanning [2017], but the implications of that distinction were not fully consid-
ered in that work. By considering this pair of prices we are able to determine conditions for
existence and uniqueness under capital adequacy and leverage requirements in equilibrium; as
far as the authors are aware, this is the first time that uniqueness results are provided in such a
setting. Similar to the dynamic setting of Feinstein [2020], the uniqueness results of this work
can be used to calibrate the risk-weights to the liquidity of assets; this is in contrast with the
prevailing heuristic methodology used in practice. In addition, we introduce sensitivity results
in the fire sale framework which we use to determine two vital statistics: the cost of regulation
during a crisis and the value of a rescue fund (whether a bailout external to the system or
from other firms in the system). Sensitivity in the fire sale setting of Amini et al. [2016] was
proposed in Chen et al. [2016] to study similar questions; as far as the authors are aware, this
work is the first time such results are available in the literature based on leverage-type con-
straints. Importantly, all results presented herein hold in markets with multiple assets subject
to general price impact functions and with general liquidation strategies satisfying simple, fi-
nancially meaningful, conditions. The mathematical results of this work lead to a few financial
implications, namely we are able to determine valid risk-weights for illiquid assets as a map-
ping of the illiquidity (Corollary 3.4) and, separately, provide a toolbox to analytically study
other policy questions, e.g., the value of a rescue fund (Section 4.3). Furthermore, the general
liquidation functions considered herein allow us to compare the proportional liquidation strat-
egy prevalent in the literature (see, e.g., Greenwood et al. [2015], Cont and Schaanning [2019],
Capponi and Weber [2020]) to more sophisticated optimization-based strategies; in particular,
we find that the tradeoffs typically reported between diversification of the initial balance sheet
and diversity of investments no longer hold under this more sophisticated liquidation strategy
(Section 5.1).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we develop the financial
setting for our model and consider liquidation strategies. Notably, we characterize the liquidation
strategies as functions of both the mark-to-market and volume weighted average prices. In
Section 3, we formulate the clearing liquidations as a fixed point problem and develop conditions
for the existence and uniqueness of these equilibrium prices. In Section 4, we formulate the
sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to the system parameters as a fixed
point problem and provide a closed-form representation for this result. Further, we utilize these
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results to develop a methodology to evaluate the cost of regulation in stress scenarios and study
the value of bailouts. Numerical case studies highlighting the applications of this model are
presented in Section 5. The proofs of the main results are provided in an Online Appendix.
2 Financial setting
We begin with some simple notation that will be consistent for the entirety of this paper. Let
x, y ∈ Rn for some positive integer n, then
x ∧ y = (min(x1, y1),min(x2, y2), . . . ,min(xn, yn))
⊤
,
x− = −(x ∧ ~0), and x+ = (−x)−. Further, to ease notation, we will denote [x, y] := [x1, y1] ×
[x2, y2]× . . .× [xn, yn] ⊆ Rn to be the n-dimensional compact interval for y−x ∈ Rn+. Similarly,
we will consider x ≤ y if and only if y − x ∈ Rn+. In this way we also define monotonicity of
vector-valued and multivariate functions in the component-wise sense.
2.1 Price impacts
For our modeling, we note that banks hold both liquid and illiquid assets. In line with
Braouezec and Wagalath [2019], Feinstein [2020], we consider two classes of illiquid assets: mar-
ketable (stocks or bonds issued by a non-financial corporation) or non-marketable (loans). The
distinction between these two classes of illiquid assets is that non-marketable assets are dif-
ficult to sell in the short-run, and hence cannot be liquidated during the crisis we consider
herein. For further discussion on non-marketable assets see Braouezec and Wagalath [2019],
Diamond and Rajan [2011]. Throughout this work we consider a single liquid asset, m ≥ 1
(marketable) illiquid assets, and an arbitrary number of non-marketable assets. Each mar-
ketable illiquid asset k has Mk > 0 outstanding shares; we will denote the vector of outstanding
shares by M ∈ Rm++. Any marketable illiquid asset, when sold, is subject to price impacts.
These price impacts measure the liquidity of an asset; the more liquid an asset the less the
prices are affected by market behavior.
With this in mind, we consider the market prices (with the liquid asset acting as the
numéraire) modeled by an inverse demand function. That is, the function F : [~0,M ] → Rm+
which maps units of illiquid assets being sold into corresponding prices quoted in the mar-
ket. Thus we are able to provide the terminal mark-to-market prices [MTMP] as a function of
the units of assets being sold. As we focus on financial crises in this work, we consider only
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short-term pricing and thus do not separately model temporary and permanent price impacts.
Furthermore, we could, instead, consider the demand curve for the nonbanking sector (as done
in, e.g., Capponi and Larsson [2015]) which may result from, e.g., an optimization strategy; the
inverse demand function could then be constructed from this demand curve.
Assumption 2.1. The MTMP exhibits no direct cross impacts, i.e., F (Γ) := (f1(Γ1), · · · , fm(Γm))
⊤
.
Additionally, fk : [0,Mk] → (0, 1] is nonincreasing with fk(0) = 1 for every asset k = 1, ...,m.
This implies that Mk denotes, also, the original market capitalization for each asset k.
However, when liquidating assets, the price attained in the market is a different (higher) price
than the MTMP. Remaining with the notion of a static framework common in the literature,
e.g., in Cifuentes et al. [2005], Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017], we consider this price as the
average MTMP throughout the liquidations. That is, we define the volume weighted average
price [VWAP] as the mapping F¯ : [~0,M ]→ Rm+ such that
Γ ∈ [~0,M ] 7→ F¯k(Γ) := f¯k(Γk) :=
1
Γk
∫ Γk
0
fk(γk)dγk
(with f¯k(0) = 1) for every asset k. Intuitively, the VWAP encodes the notion that liquidating
assets captures the entire price history as prices fall (as modeled by the inverse demand function
F ), e.g., the first marginal unit of asset k is sold at the initial MTMP fk(0) = 1 and, after
γk units of asset k have been sold, the next marginal unit is liquidated at the MTMP fk(γk).
This distinction between MTMP and VWAP was presented previously in Acerbi and Scandolo
[2008] in a single-firm liquidity setting under the terminology “marginal supply-demand curve”
and “supply-demand curve” respectively. Thus considering these two separate prices makes this
model more realistic and enables us to encode a dynamic notion which is absent in the existing
systemic risk literature. Notably, the VWAP naturally satisfies the property that the value
obtained from liquidating assets grows as more assets are sold, i.e., Γk ∈ [0,Mk] 7→ Γkf¯k(Γk) is
strictly increasing. This property is the primary one introduced in Amini et al. [2016].
Remark 2.2. We wish to note that a similar notion of differentiating between the MTMP and
VWAP is introduced in Cont and Schaanning [2017]. That work considers a heuristic parameter
η ∈ [0, 1], which defines the VWAP by f¯k(Γk) = (1 − η) + ηfk(Γk). In contrast, we use the
MTMP in order to find the actualized VWAP.
We conclude our discussion of the inverse demand function by considering 4 example func-
tions and the resultant VWAPs.
Example 2.3. Throughout these examples, and this work, we use the convention that 0/0 = 1.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the terminal mark-to-market price and associated volume weighted average
price from a limit order book construction as in Example 2.3(i).
(i) First, let us consider a construction of price impacts that follow from a limit order
book construction. In the limit order book, there are fixed price levels with limited
liquidity at each level. Consider price levels qkj > 0 with liquidity mkj > 0 such that
qk,j+1 < qkj for every j ≥ 0 with qk0 = 1 and mk0 = 0. Then the MTMP is defined by
x ∈ [0,Mk] 7→
∑
j≥0 qkjI{x∈[
∑j
i=0
mki ,
∑j+1
i=0
mki)}
. The resultant VWAP is then given by
f¯k(x) =
1
x
∑
j≥0 qkj
[
x ∧
∑j+1
i=0 mki − x ∧
∑j
i=0mki
]
for x ∈ [0,Mk]. An example of this
inverse demand function setting is provided in Figure 1.
(ii) Second, consider a generalization of the linear price impact function common in the litera-
ture (e.g., Braouezec and Wagalath [2019], Duarte and Eisenbach [2018], Cont and Schaanning
[2019], Greenwood et al. [2015]). Let the MTMP be defined by x ∈ [0,Mk] 7→ fk(x) =
1−bxa for a ≥ 0 and b ∈ [0,M−αk ). The resultant VWAP is then given by f¯k(x) = 1−
b
1+ax
a
for any x ∈ [0,Mk]. In particular, this satisfies the construction of the VWAP from
Cont and Schaanning [2017] with η = 11+a as described in Remark 2.2. We wish to note
that many commonly used inverse demand functions exist in this setting: if a = 1 then
this is the linear inverse demand function studied in, e.g., Braouezec and Wagalath [2019],
Duarte and Eisenbach [2018], Cont and Schaanning [2017], Greenwood et al. [2015]; if a =
1
2 then this satisfies the square root law for market impacts as considered in, e.g., Pohl et al.
[2017] and citations therein; if a = 2 then this has a quadratic price impact as in, e.g.,
Almgren and Chriss [2001].
(iii) Third, consider a different generalization of the linear price impact function. Let the
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MTMP be defined by x ∈ [0,Mk] 7→ fk(x) = (1 − bx)a for b ≤ M
−1
k with ab ≥ 0. The
resultant VWAP is then given by f¯k(x) =


1
(1+a)bx
[
1− (1− bx)1+a
]
if a 6= −1
− log(1−bx)
bx
if a = −1
for any
x ∈ [0,Mk].
(iv) Finally, consider the exponential inverse demand function for the MTMP, i,e, x ∈ [0,Mk] 7→
fk(x) = exp(−bx) for b ≥ 0. The resultant VWAP is then given by f¯k(x) =
1
bx
[1− exp(−bx)]
for any x ∈ [0,Mk].
2.2 The stylized balance sheet
We will consider two time points t ∈ {0, 1}. At t = 0, a bank or firm holds x ≥ 0 liquid assets
(e.g., cash). As mentioned in the prior section, we will assume, without loss of generality, that
the price of this asset stays constant at 1 at all times. In addition to this liquid asset, the bank
portfolio is comprised of illiquid assets. We assume that each bank holds s ∈ [~0,M ] ⊆ Rm+ shares
of the marketable illiquid assets and ℓ ≥ 0 of non-marketable assets. Without loss of generality,
and as in Assumption 2.1, we assume that the price of all the (marketable) illiquid assets are
F (~0) = F¯ (~0) = ~1 at time 0.
On the other side of the balance-sheet each bank or firm has p¯ ≥ 0 in liabilities. For simplicity
in this work, we will assume that all liabilities are not held by any other firms in this system;
additionally, we will assume that no liabilities come due during the (short time horizon) of the
fire sale cascade under study, but are liquid enough that they can frictionlessly be paid off early
with liquid assets. Thus, at time 0, this bank has a capital of x+ ℓ+~1⊤s− p¯. This is depicted
in Figure 2.
Remark 2.4. Prior fire sale literature, e.g., Cifuentes et al. [2005], Amini et al. [2016], Weber and Weske
[2017] consider the joint impacts of default contagion and price-mediated contagion; those works
study default contagion by introducing interbank assets and liabilities. We study the simpler
setting with external assets and liabilities only because, empirically, the price mediated conta-
gion has been shown to cause much larger harm to the financial system than default contagion
(see, e.g., Feinstein and Hałaj [2020]).
At time t = 1, a firm or bank may liquidate some of its marketable illiquid assets. In
particular, the bank sells γ ∈ [~0, s] at the VWAP q¯ ∈ (0, 1]m to obtain q¯⊤γ ≥ 0 liquid assets.
The remaining s − γ marketable illiquid assets in the banking book are valued at the MTMP
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Banking Book t = 0
Assets Liabilities
Liquid
x
Illiquid
(Marketable)
~1⊤s
Illiquid
(Non-marketable)
ℓ
Total
p¯
Capital
x+ ℓ+~1⊤s
−p¯
Banking Book t = 1
Assets Liabilities
Liquid
x
q¯⊤γ
Illiquid
(Marketable)
q⊤(s− γ)
Illiquid
(Non-marketable)
ℓ
Total
p¯
Capital
C := x+ ℓ+
q¯⊤γ + q⊤[s− γ]
−p¯
Figure 2: Stylized banking book for a firm before and after liquidation updates.
q ∈ (~0, q¯]. We will denote this space of joint MTMP and VWAP prices by the lattice
D := {(q, q¯) ∈ [F (M), F (~0)]× [F¯ (M), F¯ (~0)] | q ≤ q¯}.
The capital at time t = 1 is thus given by C := x+ ℓ+ q¯⊤γ + q⊤[s− γ]− p¯. This is depicted in
Figure 2.
Remark 2.5. While computing the capital of a bank, the proceeds from liquidation is given by
q¯⊤γ. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature on fire sales (e.g., Braouezec and Wagalath
[2019], Feinstein and El-Masri [2017]) where no distinction is made between liquidation price and
current price; in prior literature the proceeds would be computed as q⊤γ. By introducing the
MTMP and VWAP prices, this is a more realistic scenario and it offers a better interpretation of
the capital of a firm. If a single price had been considered, the capital of a firm (x+ ℓ+ q⊤s− p¯)
would have been independent of liquidations γ and would depend only on the price q.
For the remainder of this work we consider n ≥ 1 banks. We will denote the set of all banks
in the system by N := {1, 2, ..., n}. In terms of vector notation, at time t = 0, the banks are
holding an amount x ∈ Rn+ of liquid assets, ℓ ∈ R
n
+ shares of non-marketable illiquid assets,
S = (sik) ∈ R
n×m
+ shares of marketable illiquid assets, and an amount p¯ ∈ R
n
+ in liabilities. By
construction, we will always set
∑
i∈N sik ≤ Mk for all assets k. At time t = 1, the banks are
liquidating Γ = (γik) ∈ [0, S] of the marketable illiquid assets.
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2.3 Capital adequacy ratio and liquidation strategies
The Basel regulation mandates the use of a capital adequacy ratio (also called the risk-weighted
capital ratio) to assess the solvency of banks. The risk-weighted capital ratio is defined as
Risk-weighted capital ratio =
Capital
Risk-Weighted Assets
The determination of the risk-weights of different assets requires the consideration of a
number of complex factors. In this case, we make the assumption that these risk-weights are
known to us and given by 0 for the liquid asset and αk ≥ 0 for marketable illiquid asset
k = 1, ...,m. For the non-marketable asset we let the risk-weight be dependent on each bank
and let αℓ,i ≥ 0 be the risk-weight for the non-marketable assets of bank i ∈ N . To simplify
notation, we define A := diag(α1, ..., αm) to be the diagonal matrix of the risk-weights of the
marketable illiquid assets.
Thus at time t = 0, the risk-weighted capital ratio θi of bank i is given by
θi(0) =
xi + ℓi + ~1
⊤si − pi
~1⊤Asi + αℓ,iℓi
According to banking regulations, banks are required to maintain a minimum capital ratio
θmin > 0, e.g., 8% in Basel II regulations. We wish to note that this capital adequacy ratio is
related to a leverage requirement if all risk-weights are set to 1.
At time t = 0, banks may or may not be in compliance with this regulatory constraint (the ini-
tial banking book could be constructed via, e.g., portfolio optimization constrained by the capital
regulation; such a construction is outside the scope of this work). In Braouezec and Wagalath
[2019], it is assumed that an external shock occurs at time t = 0+ to which banks must react
at time t = 1; herein, we do not explicitly differentiate between times t = 0 and t = 0+ to
simplify notation. If we were to consider the shock setting, this could be a shock to the value
of liquid or illiquid assets (marketable or non-marketable) as is standard in the literature (see,
e.g., Braouezec and Wagalath [2019], Greenwood et al. [2015], Duarte and Eisenbach [2018]) or
a shock in the risk-weights, i.e., where the risk-weight of an asset jumps due to, e.g., a credit
downgrade. We specifically wish to highlight the setting in which the non-marketable illiquid
assets are shocked in order to draw comparisons to the 2007-2009 financial crisis in which the
stressors were from subprime mortgages going unpaid (direct shocks leading to a drop in ℓi) and
credit downgrades of those same assets (indirect shocks leading to increases in αℓ,i).
Depending on the state of the balance sheets of the financial institutions at t = 0, the
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capital ratio of some banks may fall below the regulatory minimum θmin. In this situation,
banks typically have two options: issue new equity or liquidate portions of the banking book.
At the time of a crisis, issuing new equity might not be feasible. As such, banks will be forced
to liquidate assets to meet the regulatory constraint. However, these liquidations can set off a
fire sale causing additional losses to the system.
When a bank is forced to liquidate assets, they do so in a minimal way. That is, they
liquidate the minimal value necessary to recover
θi(1) :=
xi + ℓi + q¯
⊤γi + q
⊤[si − γi]− p¯i
q⊤A[si − γi] + αℓ,iℓi
≥ θmin
and will do nothing if they already satisfy this regulatory requirement. This practice is in line
with the existing literature Braouezec and Wagalath [2019], Greenwood et al. [2015], Duarte and Eisenbach
[2018], Feinstein [2020] as well as empirical evidence Adrian and Shin [2010]. It might be en-
tirely possible that even when a bank liquidates all its assets it cannot restore its capital ratio
to θmin at time 1. In this situation we will assume that such a bank is insolvent and costlessly
liquidated at t = 1 (while liquidating all of its marketable assets in the market and thus de-
pressing those prices) along the lines of Braouezec and Wagalath [2019]; this costless liquidation
of non-marketable assets can be viewed as a consequence of collateralized borrowing as these
assets will be transferred, rather than sold, in case of insolvency.
To this end, bank i ∈ N can belong to any of the following three mutually exclusive and
exhaustive sets given the prices (q, q¯) ∈ D. To shorten notation throughout this work we will
define the shortfall of bank i as hi := p¯i − xi − (1− αℓ,iθmin)ℓi.
• Solvent and liquid : Let us denote this set by S(q, q¯). For any bank i ∈ S(q, q¯), γi(q, q¯) = ~0.
In fact, this set is characterized by hi ≤ q⊤[I −Aθmin]si.
• Solvent but illiquid : Let us denote this set by L(q, q¯). For any bank i ∈ L(q, q¯),
(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)
⊤ γi(q, q¯) = hi − q
⊤[I −Aθmin]si.
In fact, this set is characterized by q⊤[I −Aθmin]si < hi < q¯⊤si.
• Insolvent : Let us denote this set by D(q, q¯). For any bank i ∈ D(q, q¯), γi(q, q¯) = si. In
fact, this set is characterized by hi ≥ q¯⊤si.
These conditions are encoded mathematically in Assumption 2.6 below.
Assumption 2.6. Given a coupled MTMP and VWAP (q, q¯) ∈ D, the system of banks will
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liquidate Γ(q, q¯) ∈ [0, S] marketable illiquid assets satisfying the minimal liquidation condition
for each bank i:
(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)
⊤
γi(q, q¯) =
(
hi − q
⊤[I −Aθmin]si
)+
∧
[
(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)
⊤
si
]
(1)
for shortfall hi := p¯i − xi − (1− αℓ,iθmin)ℓi.
We refer to (1) as the minimal liquidation condition as it provides the minimal amount
needed to be liquidated in order to satisfy the capital adequacy requirement θi(1) ≥ θmin, or
liquidate all assets if insolvent. This is similar to the liquidity constraint used in Feinstein [2017],
Feinstein and El-Masri [2017].
Before considering some sample liquidation functions, we wish to give one more consideration
of the risk-weights.
Assumption 2.7. Throughout this work we will assume that αkθmin < 1 for every asset k =
1, 2, ...,m.
If αkθmin ≥ 1 for any k, then the setting of this paper implies that as price drops in that
asset, the bank will always satisfy the capital regulation which is opposite to the scenario that
we are modeling. For further discussion see Remark 2.2 of Feinstein [2020].
We complete this section by discussing a few sample liquidation functions satisfying Assump-
tion 2.6.
Example 2.8.
(i) Consider a setting with only m = 1 marketable illiquid asset. In this setting, (1) uniquely
defines the liquidations any bank would take:
γ(q, q¯) =
(
h− q(1− αθmin)s
q¯ − (1 − αθmin)q
)+
∧ s
for any (q, q¯) ∈ D. We wish to note that this liquidation function γ is continuous and
nonincreasing in (q, q¯) ∈ D.
(ii) Consider a setting in which a bank wishes to maintain its current portfolio ratio, i.e., when
it liquidates it sells shares of its full portfolio. Proportional liquidation has been widely
explored in the existing literature (e.g., Duarte and Eisenbach [2018], Greenwood et al.
[2015], Cont and Schaanning [2017]) for the analysis of fire sales. Such a strategy is defined
by:
γ(q, q¯) =
[(
h− q⊤[I −Aθmin]s
(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)⊤s
)+
∧ 1
]
s
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for any (q, q¯) ∈ D. We wish to note that this liquidation function γ is continuous and
nonincreasing in (q, q¯) ∈ D.
(iii) Consider now the first of two strategies based on utility maximization. In this first setting,
a bank decides on its liquidation strategy γ so as to maximize some strictly concave utility
function u. As such we consider firms to be utility maximizers of the following problem
rather than following a mechanical property:
γ(q, q¯) = argmax
γ∈G(q,q¯)
u(γ)
with constraint set provided by a relaxation of the minimal liquidation condition:
G(q, q¯) =
{
γ ∈ [~0, s] | (q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)
⊤γ ≥ (h− q⊤[I − Aθmin]s)
+ ∧ [(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)
⊤s]
}
for any (q, q¯) ∈ D. By strict concavity and using Berge’s maximum theorem, we can show
that this utility maximizing liquidation function is continuous. If u is also decreasing then
this will satisfy the minimal liquidation condition (1).
(iv) Consider now an extension of the utility maximizer, but one that also depends on the
actions of other firms. Consider bank i to follow this strategy and the aggregate liquidations
of all other banks is given by γ∗−i ∈ R
m
+ :
γi(q, q¯; γ
∗
−i) = argmax
γi∈G(q,q¯)
ui(γi, γ
∗
−i)
for prices (q, q¯) ∈ D. We call this an equilibrium strategy since, if multiple firms follow
this strategy, the actualized liquidations would be the solution of a fixed point problem.
Notably, so long as the utility functions are strictly concave then this liquidation strategy
is continuous w.r.t. the prices and liquidations of the other firms. As with the utility
maximizer liquidation function, if ui is also decreasing then this strategy will satisfy the
minimal liquidation condition (1). Finally, if all firms utilizing this liquidation strategy
construct a diagonally strictly concave game (see, e.g., Rosen [1965]) then there exists
a unique fixed point liquidation strategy, and that strategy is continuous in the prices
(q, q¯) ∈ D.
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3 Clearing formulation and solutions
With this thorough discussion of the financial setting, we now wish to consider the problem
of finding the clearing prices. Though the minimal liquidation condition (1) gives information
about the liquidations that bank i performs under the MTMP and VWAP (q, q¯) ∈ D, when
actualizing these sales the prices will adjust according to the inverse demand functions F and
F¯ . Therefore, this problem can accurately be modeled using a fixed point equation.
As discussed above, consider the matrix of liquidations Γ(q, q¯) ∈ [0, S] at MTMP and VWAP
of (q, q¯) ∈ D. We seek an equilibrium price so that the resultant price from liquidations is equal
to the prices that generate those liquidations. That is, we seek the fixed point to the function
Φ : D→ D defined by:
(q, q¯) ∈ D 7→ Φ(q, q¯) :=
(
F (Γ(q, q¯)⊤~1) , F¯ (Γ(q, q¯)⊤~1)
)
. (2)
We call (q, q¯) ∈ D a clearing solution or clearing prices if (q, q¯) = Φ(q, q¯). This is distinct from
the algorithmic and iterative approach in which banks act and capture different prices over
(potentially fictitious) time, we refer to, e.g., Feinstein [2020] for such a dynamic setting; we
focus on this equilibrium setup for analytical tractability for, e.g., sensitivity analysis considered
in Section 4.
In this section, we develop conditions for existence and uniqueness of the clearing prices. In
the existing literature on price-mediated contagion due to leverage and capital adequacy ratio
requirements, existence of (static) clearing solutions has been explored for the one asset case
in Braouezec and Wagalath [2019] and for the multi-asset case in Feinstein and El-Masri [2017].
However in these works, uniqueness of the clearing prices has not been previously solved. This
is tackled directly in Theorem 3.2. First, in Proposition 3.1, we present simple conditions for
the existence of the clearing prices.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the regulatory and balance sheet assumptions from Section 2.
(i) Let the inverse demand function F : [~0,M ] → (0, 1]m be continuous. If the liquidation
function Γ : D→ [0, S] is continuous, then there exists a clearing price (q∗, q¯∗).
(ii) If the liquidation function Γ : D→ [0, S] is nonincreasing, then there exists a greatest and
least clearing price (q↑, q¯↑) ≥ (q↓, q¯↓).
Now we present the primary theoretical result of this section; that is, we consider the unique-
ness of these clearing prices. The adoption of the VWAP in this framework, besides providing
a more realistic financial framework, offers significant mathematical advantages, particularly in
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the analysis of uniqueness as is evident from the preceding theorem as this was unable to be
proven in, e.g., Braouezec and Wagalath [2019], Feinstein and El-Masri [2017].
Theorem 3.2. Consider the setting of Proposition 3.1(ii). Let the inverse demand function be
such that
Γ∗ ∈ [~0,M ] 7→ F¯ (Γ∗)⊤Γ∗ + F (Γ∗)⊤[I −Aθmin](M − Γ
∗)
is strictly increasing. If the liquidation function Γ : D → [0, S] satisfies Assumption 2.6, then
there exists a unique clearing price (q∗, q¯∗).
Remark 3.3. We want to point out the similarity in the uniqueness condition presented in this
work to one of the very few uniqueness result in the fire sale literature as presented in Amini et al.
[2016], Feinstein [2017]. In those works, the liquidation occurs based on a leverage ratio (α = ~1)
with no leverage allowed (θmin = 1). Our new condition on the inverse demand function in
Theorem 3.2 reduces exactly to the condition from those papers. In fact, given our construction
of the VWAP from the MTMP, the property Γ∗ ∈ [~0,M ] 7→ F¯ (Γ∗)⊤Γ∗ strictly increasing
is automatically satisfied. Thus our result can be seen as a generalization of the uniqueness
condition provided in Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017].
Theorem 3.2 provides a condition for the uniqueness of solution for an equilibrium price
(q∗, q¯∗) in terms of the inverse demand function F . However this condition also depends on
the risk-weights α. We can make this dependence explicit by stating the uniqueness condition
in terms of the inverse demand function F and the risk-weights α along the lines of Feinstein
[2020]. This is described in the following corollary. This is important as it allows us to calibrate
the risk-weights to the liquidity of the assets.
Corollary 3.4. Let the inverse demand function F be differentiable and such that Γ∗k ∈ [0,Mk] 7→
(Mk−Γ
∗
k)f
′
k(Γ
∗
k)
fk(Γ∗k)
is nondecreasing for every asset k = 1, 2, ..,m. Additionally, let αk ∈
1
θmin
×
(− Mkf
′
k(0)
1−Mkf ′k(0)
, 1) for every asset k. If the liquidation function Γ : D → [0, S] is nonincreasing
and satisfies Assumption 2.6, then there exists a unique clearing price (q∗, q¯∗).
Remark 3.5. Corollary 3.4 provides sufficient conditions for the uniqueness property given in
Theorem 3.2. As such, it is a stronger set of conditions than presented in Theorem 3.2. However,
we feel that the conditions of Corollary 3.4 are easier to test and evaluate as it separates
the conditions on the inverse demand function and the risk-weights, while also providing a
nice interpretation in terms of calibrating risk-weights. We wish to note that the conditions
of Corollary 3.4 exactly coincide with those provided in Lemma 3.11 of Feinstein [2020] in a
continuous-time model of the proportional liquidation setting. The condition on the inverse
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demand function (Γ∗k ∈ [0,Mk] 7→
(Mk−Γ
∗
k)f
′
k(Γ
∗
k)
fk(Γ∗k)
is nondecreasing) is discussed in detail in
Remark 3.5 of that work. In short, this condition implies that a financial institution does not
need to increase the speed it is selling the illiquid assets solely to counteract its own impacts.
Example 3.6. We now wish to consider our example inverse demand functions to determine
under which scenarios they satisfy the differentiability and monotonicity condition of Corol-
lary 3.4 with nonincreasing liquidation functions (e.g., proportional liquidation). Though the
utility maximizing and equilibrium liquidation strategies have clearing solutions, the results of
this work are not strong enough to guarantee uniqueness of those clearing prices.
(i) The limit order book setting is not differentiable, and thus cannot be used with the results
of Corollary 3.4. In fact, due to the jumps in the MTMP, the uniqueness condition of
Theorem 3.2 cannot hold globally, though we can still guarantee a maximal (and minimal)
clearing solution.
(ii) If f(x) = 1 − bxa then Corollary 3.4 is satisfied so long as a ≤ 1 and b ∈ [0,M−a).
Though, if a < 1 then the condition for α results in an empty interval. This is confirmed
by observing the results of Theorem 3.2 to determine that uniqueness holds so long as a ≥ 1
with α ∈ 1
θmin
× (
a(M−xf )−M(1−bMx
a−1
f
)
(1+a)(M−xf )−M(1−bMx
a−1
f
)
, 1) for xf ∈ [0,M ] solving f(x) = a(1−
x
M
).
Note that xf is unique if a ≥ 1 but nonexistent if a < 1.
(iii) If f(x) = (1 − bx)a then Corollary 3.4 is satisfied for any b < M−1 with ab ≥ 0. The
risk-weight α is then constrained by α ∈ 1
θmin
× ( abM1+abM , 1).
(iv) If f(x) = exp(−bx) then Corollary 3.4 is satisfied for any b ≥ 0. The risk-weight α is then
constrained by α ∈ 1
θmin
× ( bM1+bM , 1).
Intriguingly, the two generalizations of the linear inverse demand function provide very different
results related to uniqueness of the clearing solution. Further consideration of this discrepancy
and deduction of the appropriate shape of the inverse demand function would be an important
follow-up study.
4 Stability and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we perform sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to the
system parameters. This is a critical exercise as the exact system parameters are often uncertain
and the results depend on how these parameters are calibrated. As far as the authors are
aware, a systematic study on the dependence of clearing prices to system parameters has not
been undertaken previously. We characterize the sensitivity analysis as a fixed point problem
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and prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to this problem. In particular, we are
interested in studying the sensitivity of the clearing solution to changes in the risk-weights αk, the
regulatory threshold θmin, and the firm shortfall hi. Sensitivity to risk-weights provides a first-
order approximation for the impacts of a credit downgrade on the health of the financial system.
We study the sensitivity with respect to the regulatory threshold, not because it is potentially
unknown, but because it allows us to quantify the cost of regulation to the different banks during
a crisis. We elaborate on this point in Section 4.2. Finally, in considering sensitivity with respect
to the firm shortfall, we are able to quantify a measure of how uncertainty in the shortfall might
impact the health of the financial system. In addition, we propose a methodology to determine
when there are incentives for a bailout from a central bank or from other institutions in the
financial system. We elaborate on this point in Section 4.3. This question was also proposed
and studied in Chen et al. [2016].
4.1 Sensitivity analysis
Throughout this section let # denote an arbitrary parameter of the fire sale model considered
in this work. For example, # can denote αk for some asset k. We utilize this general notation
as we will see that the sensitivity analysis can be constructed in this general setting with only
minor adjustments.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the setting of Theorem 3.2 in which the liquidation function Γ : D →
[0, S] is such that γi is strictly decreasing on {(q, q¯) ∈ D | i ∈ L(q, q¯)} for any bank i. Define
Γ∗ : D → [~0,M ] as (q, q¯) ∈ D 7→ Γ(q, q¯)⊤~1. The partial derivatives describing the sensitivity of
clearing prices (q∗, q¯∗) to the parameter # are defined by:

 ∂q∗∂#
∂q¯∗
∂#

 =

I −

 diag [F ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))] 0
0 diag
[
F¯ ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
]



 JΓ∗(q∗, q¯∗)
JΓ∗(q∗, q¯∗)




−1
×

 diag [F ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))]
diag
[
F¯ ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
]

 ∂Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗; #)
∂#
where JΓ∗(q∗, q¯∗) denotes the Jacobian of Γ∗ at (q∗, q¯∗) and, to simplify notation, F ′(Γ∗) :=
(f ′1(Γ
∗
1), ..., f
′
m(Γ
∗
m))
⊤ and similarly with F¯ ′(Γ∗).
The representation of ∂q
∗
∂# provided in Theorem 4.1 follows from implicit differentiation on
the clearing mechanism (2). To verify that this representation is well-defined, in Online Ap-
pendix B.1, we prove the invertibility of the matrix on the right-hand side as a Leontief inverse.
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This matrix inverse provides the additional gains or losses caused solely by the clearing mecha-
nism due to contagion effects.
One simple application of the sensitivity analysis provided by Theorem 4.1 is in studying
the impacts of (marginal) changes in the risk-weights of the various assets under study in this
work. For instance, if an asset is subject to a credit downgrade then its risk-weight will increase.
Though in reality these take discrete values, we are able to analytically describe the impact
to the equilibrium prices (q∗, q¯∗) of a marginal change in the risk-weight αk of asset k. In
particular, a change in the risk-weight for a single asset can cause cross-impacts to all other
assets through the fire-sale mechanism as well. The total impact to market capitalization, due
to the drop in MTMPs, from a parallel jump in risk-weights (e.g., from a market downturn
causing a system-wide reevaluation of credit ratings) can be quantified as
m∑
k=1
∂M⊤q∗
∂αk
= M⊤
m∑
k=1
∂q∗
∂αk
.
As a market downturn increases the risk of credit default events, all risk-weights are subject
to shifts during exactly the financial crises studied in this work. As such, this drop in market
capitalization can be considered as a stability check on the clearing prices in order to account
for these feedback effects, which are otherwise not considered.
4.2 Cost of regulation
A particularly interesting application of the sensitivity analysis provided by Theorem 4.1 is in
the development of a scheme for computing the cost of regulation incurred by each bank in a
stress scenario. This is based on the idea that a tightened regulatory threshold θmin, during a
stress scenario, will result in an increased loss for a bank due to the pro-cyclical nature of this
regulatory environment. Therefore computing the loss incurred for a marginal increase in the
regulatory threshold gives a measure of the regulatory cost for a bank. The loss incurred, and
hence the cost of regulation, may be quantified in three different ways which we will consider.
In the following computations, we wish to provide a reminder that the shortfall hi of bank i also
depends on θmin, which must also be taken into account.
• Cost of regulation on markets: Consider the post-fire sale total market capitalizationM⊤q∗
where (q∗, q¯∗) denotes the clearing prices. As the regulatory threshold θmin increases,
the stressed banks have to liquidate additional assets to satisfy the tighter regulatory
environment. This causes prices to drop and feedback effects to the system. Ultimately,
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these effects are also felt by the market as a whole by causing a drop in the market
capitalizations. Mathematically, the losses to the market capitalization caused by this
marginal tightening of the regulatory threshold, denoted by CR, is provided by
CR :=
∂M⊤(~1− q∗)
∂θmin
= −M⊤
∂q∗
∂θmin
.
• Cost of regulation from realized losses: Let us consider the situation where, under the
current regulatory regime, a bank has to liquidate a part of its assets. As the threshold
θmin increases, that bank has to liquidate even more of its assets to satisfy the capital
adequacy requirements. We can use the marginal change in losses from implementing the
sales from a marginal change in θmin to quantify the cost of regulation. Let (q
∗, q¯∗) be the
clearing prices and let γi(q
∗, q¯∗) be the liquidation strategy of bank i under the current
regulatory environment θmin. Mathematically, for bank i, we represent cost of regulation
from realized loss, denoted CRLi, as
CRLi :=
∂(~1− q¯∗)⊤γi(q∗, q¯∗; θmin)
∂θmin
= −
(
∂q¯∗
∂θmin
)⊤
γi(q
∗, q¯∗) +
(
~1− q¯∗
)⊤ ∂γi(q∗, q¯∗; θmin)
∂θmin
.
We note that ∂q¯
∗
∂θmin
can be computed using the results of Theorem 4.1, whereas ∂γi(q
∗,q¯∗;θmin)
∂θmin
depends on liquidation strategy and can be computed explicitly from that construction.
Further, we wish to note that for the situation where banks are not liquidating any assets
(i.e., i ∈ S(q∗, q¯∗)), increasing θmin by a marginal amount will not result in increased
liquidation losses; indeed in such instances CRLi is equal to 0.
• Cost of regulation from marked-to-market losses: As we noted in the discussion of the
cost of regulation from realized losses, increasing θmin will not result in increased realized
liquidation losses for solvent and liquid banks i ∈ S(q∗, q¯∗). However, increasing θmin
might cause some other bank to sell additional illiquid assets which would depreciate the
price of these assets. As banks hold overlapping portfolios this causes impacts globally to
all other banks due to mark-to-market accounting even if that particular bank was not
liquidating assets itself; for bank i, we represent cost of regulation from marked-to-market
losses, denoted CMIi, as
CMIi := −
∂
[
xi + ℓi + (q¯
∗)⊤γi(q
∗, q¯∗; θmin) + (q
∗)⊤[si − γi(q∗, q¯∗; θmin)]− p¯i
]
∂θmin
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= −
[(
∂q¯∗
∂θmin
)⊤
γi(q
∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂q∗
∂θmin
)⊤
[si − γi(q
∗, q¯∗)] + (q¯∗ − q∗)⊤
∂γi(q
∗, q¯∗; θmin)
∂θmin
]
.
Thus for bank i, CMIi is the (negative of the) sensitivity of its equity with respect to
θmin. Hence CMIi captures the losses that are not reflected in CRLi. We note that in
the situation, where none of the banks need to liquidate a fraction of their assets (i.e.,
if S(q∗, q¯∗) ∪ D(q∗, q¯∗) = N ), increasing θmin will not result in any price depreciation or
mark-to-market losses. Thus only in that case do we find that CMIi = 0 for every bank i.
4.3 Value of rescue funds
Another interesting application of the sensitivity analysis provided by Theorem 4.1 is in quan-
tifying the value of providing a marginal bailout to the financial system. We define a “central
bank bailout” to be an external rescue fund used to prop up the health of the financial system,
whereas a “private firm bailout” has funds made available by other banks in the financial system.
We consider two possible structures for the use of these rescue funds: direct rescue by providing
extra capital to a distressed bank or indirect rescue by purchasing troubled assets. Such strate-
gies were implemented during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, as well as a decade earlier in the
bailout of Long-Term Capital Management when 14 financial institutions (under supervision of
the Federal Reserve) determined it less costly to absorb the fund’s portfolio than to realize the
large mark-to-market losses. We will consider both sources of bailouts along with the appro-
priate determinations for when these strategies would be appropriate. Compare these results
with, e.g., Bernard et al. [2017] which similarly studies the incentives and decisions related to
rescue funds. As noted above, we also wish to compare these results with Chen et al. [2016]
which studies the the value of a rescue fund in the setting without leverage.
4.3.1 Direct bailouts
By providing a small amount of additional (liquid) assets to a bank, the capital adequacy
requirement becomes easier to attain and fewer assets need to be liquidated. In doing so, the
clearing MTMPs will be improved. Of note, it is possible that providing a marginal amount of
additional capital to a solvent but illiquid bank i ∈ L(q∗, q¯∗) can have outsized effects on the
health of the system via the feedback effects inherent in the clearing mechanism.
• Value of a direct central bank bailout of bank i: By providing additional capital to a bank,
that bank improves its balance sheet and therefore need not sell as many assets. This causes
the clearing MTMPs to grow, thus also raising the (time t = 1) market capitalization of the
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various assets. Of note, it is possible that providing a marginal bailout (to a solvent but
illiquid firm i ∈ L(q∗, q¯∗)) can provide outsized effects on the market capitalization of the
system, thus providing incentives to undertake this action. In particular, if the impacts
of the bailout are larger than the initial cost of the bailout, then such incentives exist.
Herein we will measure the value to society of a bailout by the impact on the total market
capitalization. Specifically, as a bailout to bank i increases the liquid holdings xi, the value
of a (marginal) direct bailout is the difference between the gains to market capitalization
due to reducing shortfall hi and the costs of the bailout itself. Mathematically, we define
this bailout decision structure as
DCBi := −
(
∂M⊤q∗
∂hi
+ 1
)
= −
(
M⊤
∂q∗
∂hi
+ 1
)
.
In particular, the sign of DCBi is important. If DCBi > 0 then a (marginal) bailout
should be undertaken to prop up bank i, otherwise the bailout ultimately costs more than
it benefits the system. Notably, this would only be given to firms that are solvent but
illiquid L(q∗, q¯∗) (but possibly not all of those such banks).
• Value of a direct private firm bailout of bank i from bank j: In contrast to the central
bank bailout considered above, a private firm bailout from bank j 6∈ D(q∗, q¯∗) to bank i
is a cash payment from j to i. This type of payment simultaneously decreases the assets
available to bank j but improves the health of bank i. In particular, to consider such
a bailout, the capital of firm j is studied given these positive and negative changes to
the shortfall of banks j and i respectively. Recall that hj = p¯j − xj − (1 − αℓ,jθmin)ℓj ,
therefore we can rewrite the capital of bank j in terms of the shortfall hj by Cj = −hj +
(q¯∗)⊤γj(q
∗, q¯∗;hj) + (q
∗)⊤[sj − γj(q∗, q¯∗;hj)] + αℓ,jθminℓj . As such, similar to the study
of central bank bailouts, we can define the private firm bailout decisions via
DPBji :=
∂Cj(hj)
∂hj
−
∂Cj(hi)
∂hi
=
(
∂q¯∗
∂hj
−
∂q¯∗
∂hi
)⊤
γj(q
∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂q∗
∂hj
−
∂q∗
∂hi
)⊤
[sj − γj(q
∗, q¯∗)]
+ (q¯∗ − q∗)⊤
[
∂γj(q
∗, q¯∗;hj)
∂hj
−
∂γj(q
∗, q¯∗;hi)
∂hi
]
− 1.
We wish to note that, typically,
∂γj(q
∗,q¯∗;hi)
∂hi
= 0 as the behavior of bank j does not depend
directly on the shortfall of bank i; we refer back to the, e.g., the proportional liquidation
strategy of Example 2.8(ii). As with the central bank bailout above, if DPBji > 0 then
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bank j has the incentive to provide a marginal rescue fund to bank i. Notably this would
only be given to firms that are solvent but illiquid L(q∗, q¯∗) (but possibly not all of those
such banks).
4.3.2 Indirect bailouts
In contrast to the direct bailouts mentioned above, it might be more politically palatable to
directly purchase distressed assets; when undertaken by a central bank, these indirect bailouts
are akin to the actions of a market maker of last resort. This kind of indirect bailout was
undertaken in the United States following the 2008 financial crisis through the Troubled Asset
Relief Program. In particular, by providing additional liquidity to an asset, the health of each
individual firm will improve through feedbacks inherent in the clearing mechanism. We wish
to note that, in this setting, we are considering a modified version of the sensitivity analysis
presented in Theorem 4.1. To consider this setting we need to introduce the modified inverse
demand function with the troubled asset purchasing. Let β ∈ Rm+ be the cash invested in this
indirect rescue of asset k, then the modified clearing problem can be written as:
(q, q¯) =

F


[∑
i∈N
γi(q, q¯)− diag[q¯]
−1β
]+ , F¯


[∑
i∈N
γi(q, q¯)− diag[q¯]
−1β
]+

 ;
as the rescue fund is also monotonic, the uniqueness argument presented in Theorem 3.2 still
holds. In considering this bailout setting, we are interested in taking the derivative w.r.t. the
rescue fund βk at β = ~0. Implicit differentiation and rearranging terms provides us with the
form for ∂q
∗
∂βk
and ∂q¯
∗
∂βk
as the same as that given in Theorem 4.1, but with new right-hand side,
i.e.,

 ∂q∗∂βk
∂q¯∗
∂βk

 = −

I −

 diag [F ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))] 0
0 diag
[
F¯ ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
]



 JΓ∗(q∗, q¯∗)
JΓ∗(q∗, q¯∗)




−1
×

 f ′k(Γ∗k(q∗,q¯∗))q¯∗k ek
f¯ ′k(Γ
∗
k(q
∗,q¯∗))
q¯∗
k
ek


where ek ∈ Rm is the unit vector with a single 1 in its kth component.
• Value of an indirect central bank bailout of asset k: By providing additional liquidity to
an asset, the MTMP and VWAP of that asset would improve. Immediately this causes
the clearing prices to grow and, due to the pro-cyclical nature of the capital adequacy
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ratio, results in banks liquidating fewer assets as well. Therefore such an indirect bailout
can easily have outsized benefits to the health of the financial system, even to assets other
than the one getting the additional liquidity; this provides an incentive for this bailout to
take place. As before, if the impacts of the bailout are larger than its initial cost, then
the incentive structure is in place for a bailout to occur. Also as before, herein we will
measure the value to society of a bailout by the impact on the total market capitalization.
Mathematically, we define this bailout decision structure via
ICBk :=
∂M⊤q∗
∂βk
− 1 = M⊤
∂q∗
∂βk
− 1.
In particular, the sign of ICBi is important. If ICBi > 0 then a (marginal) bailout should
be undertaken to provide extra liquidity to asset k, otherwise the bailout ultimately costs
more than it benefits the system. Notably, this would only be given to assets in distress
q∗k < 1 (but possibly not all of those such assets).
• Value of an indirect private firm bailout of asset k from bank j: As with the indirect
central bank bailout, an indirect private firm bailout provides additional liquidity to a
specific asset. This additional market liquidity can cause large feedback gains on the
clearing prices. In order to participate in such a bailout, we assume that the bank is
solvent, i.e., j 6∈ D(q∗, q¯∗). Such a bank would decide to participate in an indirect bailout
if the effects from providing the liquidity (on firm capital) and holding marginal more units
of asset k outweigh the costs from also increasing shortfall in tandem. As such, the value
of an indirect bailout from firm j on asset k can be computed mathematically via
IPBjk :=
∂Cj(hj)
∂hj
+
1
q¯k
∂Cj(sjk)
∂sjk
+
∂Cj(βk)
∂βk
∣∣∣∣
β=~0
=
(
∂q¯∗
∂hj
+
1
q¯∗k
∂q¯∗
∂sjk
+
∂q¯∗
∂βk
)⊤
γj(q
∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂q∗
∂hj
+
1
q¯∗k
∂q∗
∂sjk
+
∂q∗
∂βk
)⊤
[sj − γj(q
∗, q¯∗)]
+ (q¯∗ − q∗)⊤
[
∂γj(q
∗, q¯∗;hj)
∂hj
+
1
q¯∗k
∂γj(q
∗, q¯∗; sjk)
∂sjk
]
−
(
1−
q∗k
q¯∗k
)
.
As with the indirect central bank bailout above, if IPBjk > 0 then bank j has the incentive
to provide a marginal rescue fund to prop up the value of asset k. Notably, this would
only be given to assets in distress q∗k < 1 (but possibly not all of those such assets).
Remark 4.2. We conjecture that a direct bailout (of a solvent but illiquid institution) will
typically outperform an indirect bailout of the assets being held. This is due to leveraging
effects, i.e., if a bank is given additional capital, through leverage, they can avoid (in first order
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effects) liquidating a greater value of assets than they obtained in capital in the first place.
An indirect bailout will always (in first order effects) compensate for exactly the value of the
bailout. As leverage ratios are typically larger than 1, we make this conjecture.
5 Case studies
In this section we consider two case studies to discuss the implications of our model. For
simplicity, each of the case studies is undertaken with a linear inverse demand function. We
restrict the risk-weights α to the bound discussed in Corollary 3.4 and Example 3.6. Briefly, the
two case studies are as follows:
(i) First, we consider a two asset, two bank system in order to explore the implications of
diversification under different liquidation functions. We compare this case study with that
of, e.g., Capponi and Weber [2020].
(ii) Second, we consider a system of six large banks. This data is loosely calibrated to the
2015 CCAR stress test as considered in Braouezec and Wagalath [2019]. We use this data
to study the both the cost of regulation and the value of rescue funds in an illustrative
financial system.
5.1 Effects of liquidation strategies and diversification
In this case study, we consider a two bank (n = 2) and two asset (m = 2) system. We assume
that the banks do not hold any liquid or non-marketable asset, i.e., xi = ℓi = 0 for i = 1, 2. We
assume that both banks have liabilities p¯i = 1 and the total (pre-fire sale) market capitalization
of each asset is 2, i.e., Mk = s1k + s2k = 2 for k = 1, 2.
We study the impact of diversification in this system by varying the composition of the illiquid
asset holdings of each bank. To do this, we use a similar setting to Example 5.4 of Feinstein
[2020]. That is, consider a parameter λ ∈ [0, 2] and set s11 = λ, s12 =M2−λ, s21 = M1−λ, and
s22 = λ. When λ ∈ {0, 2}, the banks are holding non-overlapping portfolios, corresponding to
a fully diverse system. When λ = 1, the portfolios of the banks are identical, corresponding to
a fully diversified system. Due to symmetry between the banks, we will only consider λ ∈ [0, 1].
Thus as λ increases, the system moves from fully diverse to fully diversified.
For the purpose of this example, we will consider the linear inverse demand functions
fk(Γk) = 1 −
Γk
5 for both assets k = 1, 2. Further, we will consider two liquidation func-
tions in this case study in order to determine the impacts such choices have on the clearing
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prices and market capitalizations; these liquidation functions are:
• proportional liquidation as discussed in Example 2.8(ii);
• equilibrium liquidation as discussed in Example 2.8(iv) in which both banks are trying
to minimize their realized loss, i.e., ui(γi, γ
∗
−i) = −γ
⊤
i (~1 − F¯ (γi + γ
∗
−i)). We note that
this is a strictly decreasing and concave utility function on γi ∈ [0, si], therefore the
minimal liquidation assumption holds. Further this is a continuous, strictly concave, and
diagonally strictly concave function (see, e.g., Bichuch and Feinstein [2019] for proof of
such), therefore this strategy exists, is unique, and is continuous in the prices (q, q¯) as
discussed when introduced in Example 2.8.
We wish to compare the results for proportional liquidation to standard results, e.g., in Capponi and Weber
[2020], Detering et al. [2020]. We present it here for the direct comparison to the equilibrium
liquidation strategy which, as we demonstrate below, does not exhibit the typical tradeoffs
between diversity of bank investments with diversification of the initial trading book.
Remark 5.1. Though the equilibrium liquidation strategy has a clearing solution (Proposi-
tion 3.1(i)), it need not be unique. We compute the clearing prices by Picard iterations be-
ginning at (q0, q¯0) = (~1,~1), i.e., no impacts. We wish to note that this method converged to
a clearing solution for every choice of parameters tested hinting at a stronger property than
proven thus far.
Consider the regulatory environment with θ = 0.2 and with risk-weights α1 = α2 = 2 at
time t = 0. With these parameters, both banks satisfy the capital adequacy requirements at
t = 0 without any fire sales occurring. However, consider at time t = 0+ the first asset has a
credit downgrade causing its risk-weight to double, i.e., α1 = 4. This stress precipitates a fire
sale of one or both banks depending on their investments at time t = 1 in order to satisfy the
capital adequacy requirements. Notably, we consider the stress to the system to be a credit
downgrade rather than a shock to the balance sheet of a bank as is typically assumed (see, e.g.,
Braouezec and Wagalath [2019], Feinstein [2020]). The results of this fire sale are displayed in
Figure 3, which demonstrate the significant impacts that the choice of liquidation function has
on the clearing prices.
First, in Figure 3a, we see that cross-asset contagion is a significant factor in the proportional
liquidation scenario. That is, even though asset 2 is not shocked, under proportional liquidation
its price monotonically decreases in λ ∈ [0, 1]. The equilibrium liquidation strategy appears
to have cross-asset contagion, but only up to a point. This form of contagion is stronger
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Figure 3: Section 5.1: The impacts of diversification of portfolio holdings and liquidation strategies
on system health.
than the proportional strategy for highly diverse portfolios (λ ≤ 0.3), but reaches a limiting
amount of contagion for more diversified portfolios. Second, in Figure 3b, we see that the
total market capitalization of the system reaches its maximum, in the proportional liquidation
setting, at λ ≈ 0.4. In fact, the worst case in that setting is for the fully diversified portfolio. In
contrast, the equilibrium liquidation strategy has nondecreasing total market capitalization as
diversification increases. That is, diversification has the stabilizing effects typically assigned to
it. In aggregate, the proportional liquidation strategy outperforms the equilibrium strategy for
diverse systems (λ ≤ 0.55) but underperforms for diversified investments (λ ≥ 0.55). Previous
research, which generally consider full diversification harmful from a contagion perspective, may
have suffered from the bias of focusing on the proportional liquidation strategy. In actuality,
policy should be designed considering the strategic aspect of more realistic liquidation functions.
5.2 Six bank system
In this case study, we use our model to study a stress test of a six bank financial system. For
this, we use the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) 2015 data and consider
the six global systemically important banks with large trading operations, i.e., Bank of Amer-
ica, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo, as was
done in Braouezec and Wagalath [2019]. The data for these organizations is shown in Table 1
which has been replicated from Braouezec and Wagalath [2019]. This data allows us to directly
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Assets Risk-Weighted Assets
Capital Liquid Marketable Nonmarketable Marketable Nonmarketable
Bank C x ~1⊤s ℓ ~1⊤As αℓℓ
Bank of America 161.62 138.63 565.20 1400.70 279.40 1185.60
Citigroup 165.45 32.11 596.90 1213.17 203.50 1089.10
Goldman Sachs 90.98 57.58 473.97 324.69 335.91 234.50
JP Morgan Chase 206.59 26.97 857.40 1687.90 313.40 1305.60
Morgan Stanley 74.97 21.39 430.72 349.40 204.04 251.98
Wells Fargo 192.90 19.60 355.95 1311.61 130.24 1115.26
Table 1: Section 5.2: Assets (in billion of dollars) for the six banks under consideration.
characterize the (pre-fire sale) value of the banks’ balance sheets (with liabilities equal to the
difference between total assets and capital). For a detailed discussion of the CCAR dataset we
refer to Braouezec and Wagalath [2019]. Though we are calibrating the financial system to a
real dataset, the granular data necessary for this analysis is not known to us and, as such, this
example is for illustrative purposes only.
Asset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
α 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.2 0.25 0.35 0.5 0.6 0.75 1 2.5 4.25 6.5
Table 2: Section 5.2: Risk-weights α for the marketable illiquid assets.
From the CCAR data set we can immediately find the risk-weight αℓ,i of each firm’s non-
marketable portfolio by dividing the non-marketable risk-weighted assets by the value of the
non-marketable assets (αℓ,iℓi/ℓi). In order to calibrate each bank’s marketable portfolio s, we
make use of the risk-weights for commonly traded assets. We assume that there are m = 16
illiquid marketable asset and choose α for these 16 assets to cover a wide range of risk-weights
as depicted in Table 2. For each bank i, the individual portfolio si is chosen as the minimizer
of the following minimum norm problem
min
s˜i∈Rm+
{
‖s˜i‖2
∣∣∣ ~1⊤s˜i = ~1⊤si, ~1⊤As˜i = ~1⊤Asi}
where the value of the assets ~1⊤si and the risk-weighted assets ~1
⊤As˜i are provided in Ta-
ble 1. Additionally, we use these risk-weights to calibrate the linear inverse demand functions
fk(Γk) = 1 − bkΓk by setting bk =
4αkθmin
5(1−αkθmin)Mk
; this choice of liquidity parameter guarantees
the uniqueness properties of Corollary 3.4. Finally, in accordance with Basel II regulations,
we set θmin = 0.08. We wish to emphasize that the purpose of this calibration is to provide a
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demonstrative data set for the case study. An accurate calibration of the financial system is an
interesting problem in itself and beyond the scope of the current work.
For simplicity and comparison to prior literature (e.g., Greenwood et al. [2015]), we assume
all banks follow a proportional liquidation strategy. Under the setting considered, no fire sale
occurs. This validates our modeling assumptions as no large market event occurred during the
period this data covers. Consider now a 5% shock to the non-marketable assets ℓi for each of the
6 banks. Under this stress regime, four banks (Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and
Wells Fargo) do not need to liquidate any assets in the fire sale. However, JP Morgan Chase is
solvent but illiquid, and Bank of America is insolvent in this stress scenario.
With this stress scenario, we first wish to provide the costs of regulation (as discussed in
Section 4.2). This is displayed in Figure 4. Consistent with the theory, only Bank of America
and JP Morgan Chase show a non-zero CRL, all 6 banks have a non-zero CMI. This highlights
that even though four banks are not liquidating under the current stress regime, they will incur
mark-to-market losses if θmin is increased. We also wish to highlight the costs incurred to the
market as a whole due to increased regulatory oversight CR = 3276.8 far exceeds the costs
incurred by any individual bank.
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Figure 4: Section 5.2: Cost of Regulation CRL and CMI.
Finally, we wish to consider the value of direct and indirect rescues of this system. For
direct rescues, we look only at the values of supporting JP Morgan Chase, as all other banks
are either liquid or insolvent and, as such, would be unaffected by a marginal influx of liquidity.
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Notably, we find that there is a benefit to society for providing such a central bank bailout to
JP Morgan Chase with DCBJPM = 0.3507. However, no solvent and liquid institution benefits
enough from joining a private firm bailout in this scenario (DPB·,JPM ≈ −0.8). As conjectured
in Remark 4.2, the value of the indirect central bank bailout of every asset is below that of the
direct central bank bailout of JP Morgan Chase. In fact, the value of the indirect central bank
bailout is negative (with the high risk-weighted assets having ICB closer to 0 but still negative).
We did not compute the indirect private firm bailout values due to the combination of results
for the direct private firm bailouts and indirect central bank bailouts.
6 Conclusion
In this work we proposed a model for price-mediated contagion due to risk-weight based capital
adequacy requirements. In order to more accurately construct this model, we introduced a two-
tier pricing structure: the volume weighted average price (obtained during liquidation of assets)
and the mark-to-market price (to account for all unsold assets). By introducing this pricing
structure, we proved the existence and uniqueness of clearing prices; uniqueness had never been
proven previously in a leverage of capital ratio requirement based setting of price-mediated
contagion. Through the use of the uniqueness criteria, we provided conditions on the risk-
weights based on the liquidity of the assets; this is an improvement over the current, heuristic,
method for determining these risk-weights. Additionally, under the conditions of uniqueness,
we determined the sensitivity of the clearing prices to the system parameters. This sensitivity
is valuable due to the uncertainty of many system parameters. We highlighted two uses for the
sensitivity analysis: the cost of regulation during a crisis and the value of a rescue fund. These
results are utilized in two case studies. The first considers the typical study of the impact of
diversification on financial stability; in contrast to prior studies, we demonstrated that the usual
result on the tradeoff of diversification with diversity of investment strategies no longer holds
when an optimization based liquidation strategy is considered. We concluded this work with
a simulation of a financial system loosely calibrated to the CCAR 2015 stress test data and
considered, for that system, the cost of regulation during a stress scenario as well as the value
of rescue funds.
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A Proofs from Section 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. (i) This is a trivial application of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
(ii) This is a trivial application of Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. As discussed in the preceding section, a bank i can belong to any of the following three
mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets:
• solvent and liquid: S(q, q¯) = {i ∈ N | hi ≤ q⊤[I −Aθmin]si};
• solvent but illiquid: L(q, q¯) = {i ∈ N | q⊤[I −Aθmin]si < hi < q¯⊤si}; or
• insolvent: D(q, q¯) = {i ∈ N | hi ≥ q¯⊤si}.
Using the minimal liquidation condition (1), under any MTMP and VWAP prices (q, q¯) ∈ D for
any bank i:
(q¯ − [I − Aθmin]q)
⊤γi(q, q¯) =


0 if i ∈ S(q, q¯)
hi − q⊤[I −Aθmin]si if i ∈ L(q, q¯)
(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)⊤si if i ∈ D(q, q¯).
Using Proposition 3.1(ii), there exists a greatest and least clearing price (q↑, q¯↑) ≥ (q↓, q¯↓).
Further from Γ nonincreasing, Γ↑ := Γ(q↑, q¯↑))⊤~1 ≤ Γ(q↓, q¯↓))⊤~1 =: Γ↓.
Assume that there does not exist a unique clearing price, i.e., there exists some asset k such
that either q↑k > q
↓
k or q¯
↑
k > q¯
↓
k (and thus Γ
↑
k < Γ
↓
k). Thus considering that both (q
↑, q¯↑) and
(q↓, q¯↓) are clearing solutions, we utilize the additional property on the inverse demand functions
to find a contradiction:
0 > [(q¯↑)⊤Γ↑ + (q↑)⊤[I −Aθmin](M − Γ
↑)]− [(q¯↓)⊤Γ↓ + (q↓)⊤[I −Aθmin](M − Γ
↓)]
≥ [(q¯↑)⊤Γ↑ + (q↑)⊤[I −Aθmin](
n∑
i=1
si − Γ
↑)]− [(q¯↓)⊤Γ↓ + (q↓)⊤[I −Aθmin](
n∑
i=1
si − Γ
↓)]
=
∑
i∈D↑∩D↓
(q¯↑ − q¯↓)⊤si +
∑
i∈L↑∩D↓
(hi − (q¯
↓)⊤si) +
∑
i∈S↑∩D↓
([I −Aθmin]q
↑ − q¯↓)⊤si
+
∑
i∈L↑∩L↓
(hi − hi) +
∑
i∈S↑∩L↓
((q¯↑)⊤[I −Aθmin]si − hi) +
∑
i∈S↑∩S↓
(q↑ − q↓)⊤[I −Aθmin]si
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> 0
where S↑ := S(q↑, q¯↑) and S↓,L↑,L↓,D↑,D↓ are defined likewise.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3.4
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, we need only prove that Γ∗ ∈ [~0,M ] 7→ F¯ (Γ∗)⊤Γ∗ + F (Γ∗)⊤[I −
Aθmin](M − Γ
∗) is strictly increasing. By taking derivatives and rearranging terms, this is true
if for every asset k
αk > −
1
θmin
(Mk − Γ∗k)f
′
k(Γ
∗
k)
fk(Γ∗k)− (Mk − Γ
∗
k)f
′
k(Γ
∗
k)
∀ Γ∗k ∈ [0,Mk]. (3)
The additional condition on the inverse demand function F imposed in this corollary is sufficient
to ensure that the right-hand side of (3), i.e., − 1
θmin
(Mk−Γ
∗
k)f
′
k(Γ
∗
k)
fk(Γ∗k)−(Mk−Γ
∗
k
)f ′
k
(Γ∗
k
) is nonincreasing in
Γ∗k ∈ [0,Mk].
Thus to ensure (3), we require αk to satisfy the inequality at Γ
∗
k = 0. Using this fact and
Assumption 2.7, uniqueness is ensured by the conditions of this corollary.
B Proofs from Section 4
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Consider the clearing procedure (2). Implicit differentiation w.r.t. # at the equilibrium
prices (q∗, q¯∗) provides the pair of linear equations for every asset k:
∂q∗k
∂#
=
∂fk(Γ
∗
k(q
∗, q¯∗; #))
∂#
= f ′k(Γ
∗
k(q
∗, q¯∗; #))
[
m∑
l=1
(
∂Γ∗k(q
∗, q¯∗; #)
∂q∗l
∂q∗l
∂#
+
∂Γ∗k(q
∗, q¯∗; #)
∂q¯∗l
∂q¯∗l
∂#
)
+
∂Γ∗k(q
∗, q¯∗; #)
∂#
]
∂q¯∗k
∂#
=
∂f¯k(Γ
∗
k(q
∗, q¯∗; #))
∂#
= f¯ ′k(Γ
∗
k(q
∗, q¯∗; #))
[
m∑
l=1
(
∂Γ∗k(q
∗, q¯∗; #)
∂q∗l
∂q∗l
∂#
+
∂Γ∗k(q
∗, q¯∗; #)
∂q¯∗l
∂q¯∗l
∂#
)
+
∂Γ∗k(q
∗, q¯∗; #)
∂#
]
.
In matrix notation, this problem reduces to solving the linear system:
[I −W ]

 ∂q∗∂#
∂q¯∗
∂#

 =

 diag [F ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))]
diag
[
F¯ ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
]

 ∂Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗)
∂#
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W =

 diag [F ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))] 0
0 diag
[
F¯ ′(Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
]



 JΓ∗(q∗, q¯∗)
JΓ∗(q∗, q¯∗)

 .
Thus the result is proven so long as I −W is invertible. Note that W is independent of the
choice of parameter #.
We will now prove that W is an invertible matrix by considering standard input-output
analysis. To do so, we first wish to point out that W ≥ 0 as it is defined as the multiplication
of two non-positive matrices.
Recall that bank i can belong to any of the following three sets which partition the space N :
• solvent and liquid: S(q, q¯) = {i ∈ N | hi ≤ q⊤[I −Aθmin]si};
• solvent but illiquid: L(q, q¯) = {i ∈ N | q⊤[I −Aθmin]si < hi < q¯⊤si}; or
• insolvent: D(q, q¯) = {i ∈ N | hi ≥ q¯⊤si}.
For simplicity of notation, define L∗ := L(q∗, q¯∗). Let (q, q¯) ∈ D 7→ Γˆ(q, q¯) :=
∑
i∈L(q,q¯) γi(q, q¯)
and (q, q¯) ∈ D 7→ Hˆ(q, q¯) :=
∑
i∈L(q,q¯) hi. We wish to note that
∂γi(q,q¯)
∂qk
= ∂γi(q,q¯)
∂q¯k
= 0 for any
asset k with prices (q, q¯) ∈ D such that i ∈ S(q, q¯) ∪ D(q, q¯).
The minimal liquidation condition (1) implies that:
(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)
⊤Γˆ(q, q¯) = Hˆ(q, q¯)− q⊤[I −Aθmin]
∑
i∈L(q,q¯)
si
for any (q, q¯) ∈ D. Assuming no bank is at the boundary between L(q, q¯) and either S(q, q¯) or
D(q, q¯) (if so then one-sided derivatives would be required), we are able to determine by implicit
differentiation that for any prices (q, q¯) ∈ D and asset k
[1− αkθmin]

 ∑
i∈L(q,q¯)
sik − Γˆk(q, q¯)

 = −(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)⊤ ∂Γ∗(q, q¯)
∂qk
(4)
Γˆk(q, q¯) = −(q¯ − [I −Aθmin]q)
⊤ ∂Γ
∗(q, q¯)
∂q¯k
. (5)
By assumption and previous discussions of firm behaviors, (q, q¯) ∈ D 7→ F¯ (Γ∗(q, q¯))⊤Γˆ(q, q¯)+
F (Γ∗(q, q¯))⊤[I−Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗ si − Γˆ(q, q¯)
)
is strictly decreasing on (q, q¯) ∈ {(q, q¯) ∈ D | L(q, q¯) =
L∗}. By differentiation w.r.t. the MTMP qk, this implies at the clearing prices (q∗, q¯∗)
0 > F¯ (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))⊤
∂Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗)
∂qk
+
(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂qk
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗)
− F (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))⊤[I −Aθmin]
∂Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗)
∂qk
+
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂qk
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗
si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
33
for any asset k. That is, for any asset k,
(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂qk
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂qk
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗
si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
< −
(
F¯ (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))− [I −Aθmin]F (Γ
∗(q∗, q¯∗))
)⊤ ∂Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗)
∂qk
= − (q¯∗ − [I −Aθmin]q
∗)
⊤ ∂Γ
∗(q∗, q¯∗)
∂qk
.
Through comparison with (4), we are able to conclude that
(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂qk
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂qk
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗
si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
< [I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗
si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
.
(6)
Through the same analysis but applying (5) to the derivatives w.r.t. q¯k, we can also conclude
(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂q¯k
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗, q¯∗))
∂q¯k
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗
si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
< Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗).
(7)
Finally, we consider the vector
v :=

 [I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗ si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗)

 ≥ ~0.
By construction of the matrix W and an application of (6) and (7), we find that
W⊤v =


(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂q1
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂q1
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗ si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
...(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂qm
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂qm
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗ si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂q¯1
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂q¯1
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗ si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)
...(
∂F¯ (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂q¯m
)⊤
Γˆ(q∗, q¯∗) +
(
∂F (Γ∗(q∗,q¯∗))
∂q¯m
)⊤
[I −Aθmin]
(∑
i∈L∗ si − Γˆ(q
∗, q¯∗)
)


< v.
Thus an application of, e.g., Theorem 2.1 of ten Raa [2006], (I −W )−1 exists and is given by
the Leontief inverse.
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